U.S. Rep. Ken Calvert (R-CA) said on Thursday that intelligence manipulation pertaining to U.S. efforts to train Iraqi Security Forces to fight ISIS extend to the top of the intelligence community.
Calvert led a congressional joint task force (JTF) investigation into manipulation of intelligence at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 2014 and 2015. An initial report on the investigation released on Thursday found that intelligence products approved by senior CENTCOM leaders provided a positive depiction of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in Iraq that often belied facts on the ground.
“The leadership failures at CENTCOM reach to the very top of the organization,” Calvert said. “I hope that the new CENTCOM commander and the new director of intelligence can turn things around quickly. As for the task force, it is critical that we follow up on the deficiencies highlighted in this initial report. What happened at CENTCOM is unacceptable – our warfighters suffer when bad analysis is presented to senior policymakers. We must continue our efforts until we fix it.”
The initial report also found that CENTCOM process changes and leadership deficiencies led to widespread dissatisfaction among CENTCOM analysts who felt that their superiors had distorted products.
U.S. Rep. Mike Pompeo (R-KS), who co-leads the JTF with Calvert and U.S. Rep. Brad Wenstrup (R-OH), said that it was clear that CENTCOM leaders manipulated intelligence products from mid-2014 to mid-2015.
“The result: consumers of those intelligence products were provided a consistently ‘rosy’ view of U.S. operational success against ISIS,” Pompeo said. “That may well have resulted in putting American troops at risk as policymakers relied on this intelligence when formulating policy and allocating resources for the fight. I urge the Department of Defense Inspector General to hold accountable the intelligence leaders that failed our service members fighting our wars on the ground.”
Wenstrup added that the investigation revealed that unfavorable intelligence reports underwent significant scrutiny and were often omitted unless they could be confirmed with 100 percent certainty.
“As a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, I understand that intelligence is not always certain,” Wenstrup said. “Possibilities and probabilities can be just as critical for decision makers. Additionally, despite nearly nine months of review, we still do not fully understand the reasons and motivations behind this practice and how often the excluded analyses were proven ultimately to be correct. We cannot win the war against ISIS with incomplete intelligence. The report out today highlights the importance of having an independent process.”